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Abstract
"Musgravian" externalities, formulated and illustrated by Musgrave in a 1966
paper on "social goods" are seen in this paper as one form of the
interactions that occur between the components of a federation. The original
formal apparatus is first exposed briefly. In that context, it is then considered
whether and how alternative forms of federal structures are likely to achieve
efficiency. Following suggestions from the literature, three such forms are
dealt with: "planned", "cooperative" and "majority rule" federalisms. Next, the
relevance of non cooperative equilibria is examined, in the light of an
interpretation of them as "fall back" positions when disagreement occurs
among members of a federation. Finally, the question is evoked of what
economics and public finance may have to say on the limits to institutional
decentralization,  i.e. on the choice between federal, confederal and
secessional structures. The paper concludes with a reminder of Musgrave's
view on this issue.
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In my home country Belgium, cooperation between federated entities has
become of vital importance — vital in the very first sense of the word. While the
Belgian State is by now 170 years old, the Belgian federation is in fact very
young: only ten years, even a little less. And the federalisation process being a
decentralizing (some people say centrifugal) one, the issue comes up
sometimes: why is it a State, after all?
This is my motivation for the topic I chose for this talk. I realize that
speaking of this here, in a country where just the reverse did occur ten years
ago with the reunification, may seem inappropriate.
But the celebration we are in invites to a thinking of general nature. By
having written the first treatise entitled Theory of Public Finance, Richard
Musgrave has brought the general language of economic theory into public
finance and he thereby pionneered a new way to cover the field. Following that
example, I have endeavoured to cover my subject matter in as general a way as
I can.
Starting from some description of the interactions that occur within the
components of a federation and from a characterization of the efficient amount
of such interactions (Section 2), I move to the pretty classical issue of how to
achieve that efficiency in a federal framework, under alternative institutional
settings (Section 3). Leaving aside efficiency, I consider non cooperative3
equilibria, and evaluate their interest in a federal context (Section 4). While
considering further steps of decentralization, I cannot escape the issue of a
federation's dismantling and ask the question of what public finance theory can
tell us about that extreme case (Section 5). I conclude in a Musgravian spirit
(Section 6).
2. Describing interactions and optimality in the presence of externalities
Interactions between juridictions may be represented in many different
ways. For the present occasion, I find it justified to make use of one such
representation actually due to Richard Musgrave (published as Musgrave
1969). It was not designed for the study of federalism, but instead for a
discussion on the nature of public goods, and a lively exchange took place on
that basis between Richard and Paul Samuelson at an IEA Conference in
Biarritz, France in 1966 for which the paper had been prepared. I do not plan to
reopen that discussion
2 here, but well to exploit two diagrams presented by
Richard in the paper.
There are two economic agents A and B, who are not identified explicitly
in the paper as individuals, or as political parties, or as regions in a federation,
but later in this paper I shall retain this last interpretation.
Each agent's preferences are described by a preference function UA(...)
and UB(...) whose arguments are:
(i) some standard private good X — thus, XA and XB for A and B respectively;
(ii) another good denoted Y, that generates an externality on the other agent.
The purpose of Musgrave's Biarritz paper was, to a large extent, to describe and
characterize several alternative forms of the externality conveyed by Y, and to
compare these forms with the concept of public good in the strict Samuelsonian
sense. I select here two
3 of these forms. One is called by the author the case of
                                                
2 Let me only suggest to have a look at the record of it, which takes twelve pages of small font
text in the proceedings book!
3 I skip the many other cases expounded in the paper, as my purpose here is not to go and
discuss the taxonomy of externalities and public goods.4
"Non Substitute Externalities" and is expressed as follows in terms of the
arguments of the preference functions of A and B :
UA(XA,YA,YB) and UB(XB,YB,YA).
Another case is called the one  of "Mixed Benefit Goods", expressed as
UA(XA,YA,YA + YB) and UB(XB,YB,YA + YB).
In the first case, good Y produced by A is like a public good for B, since he
consumes it in equal amounts as A . If there were several agents, C, D, ..., with
YA  entering their utility function just as it is the case for B, YA would be a
standard Samuelsonian public good. A similar argument can be made for YB  ,
mutatis mutandis, which is also a (different) public good.
In the second case, YA  and YB  are in fact the same physical commodity,
provided for by both A and B, and whose sum has the virtue of being a
Samuelsonian public good
4.
With the help of two sets of diagrams, Richard determines the optimality
conditions for the supply of the externality generating good Y as appears on
Figures 1 and 2. Thus, we have that at an optimum in the first figure agent A
produces and consumes OL of YA and agent B produces and consumes OG of
YB  . In the case of the second figure, the efficient total production of Y is OE,
with OH  produced by A  and HE produced by B (Richard is not too clear on
what the respective supply curves are in this case..., but this is unimportant to
capture the essence of the argument).
                                                
4 In my joint work with Parkash Chander, dealing with international environmental problems, I
have made extensive use of this formulation, using the term of "environmental externalities"
(Chander and Tulkens 1995, 1997). The first of these references was built on a variant found in
Mäler 1989. The model is still in use today in further applications to climate change issues (see
e.g. Germain, Toint, Tulkens and de Zeeuw 1999). Another instance of use of a model in that


































































































While much of the discussion between Musgrave and Samuelson
5 bears in
fact on the proper definition of what a public good is, I am referring to it, here,
because the analytics I just recalled include a feature not much stressed in the
literature on public goods, namely that the good Y is produced by both A & B.
That is, Musgrave is writing a model with many producers of the public good (or
of the externalities). All of the literature until then, and most of it after, has
always been dealing with economies with one producer only, or one single
aggregate production function for the public good.
Where lies the interest of dealing with two (or more) producers of the
public good instead of just one? Well, precisely where issues relating to
cooperation are at stake.
Indeed, in that context, it is not only the (aggregate) amount of the public
good that matters (for the determination of which preferences must be revealed
in some appropriately cooperative way) but also the share taken by each
producer in that production and, as a consequence, the amount of resources
devoted to that by each unit. In addition, in an interpretation of A and B as
regions with both consumers and producers, the possibility arises of transfers
between regions that ought to be taken into account as they of course can play a
role in the likelihood of cooperation.
3. How to achieve efficiency?
While efficient solutions were thus well defined for each one of the two
cases, the Musgrave 1966 paper was not very explicit on the question of how
these efficient solutions could be obtained. Just a "combination of a market
mechanism and a tax-subsidy scheme" was called for by the author, but hardly
elaborated upon.
An answer was to be offered to that kind of question in the late 60's and in
the 70's by means of "resource allocation processes"
6 for public goods,
formulated in terms of differential equations. In short, these were essentially
                                                
5 With Sen's grain de sel, as he was the discussant of Musgrave's paper in Biarritz.
6 In the terminology of Arrow and Hurwicz 1977. These were often called planning models
(after Malinvaud 1970-71) or tâtonnement models (Drèze de la Vallée Poussin 1971). They find
their origin in the Lange-Lerner theory of socialism.7
mathematical algorithms allowing one to compute
7, in a tâtonnement-like
sucession of steps, an efficient solution.
But these processes were rather poor from an institutional point of view.
And institutions are of paramount importance
8 if one is to understand how an
efficient, or an equilibrium state of the economy can emerge.
A richer interpretation of the model can therefore be offered if we consider
it in the institutional framework of a federation. In this context, the issue at
stake becomes the one of achieving efficiency for the federation, the members of
which are A and B.
Several new and interesting problems arise when this view is adopted,
and these are best revealed by thinking in the terms offered recently by Inman






(iii) Majority rule federalism.
By the very definition of federalism, all of these institutional forms share
the common feature that a decentralized structure of government prevails for
handling local issues. The way in which the three forms differ is by how the
issues of common interest  are resolved that require federal policies such as, e.g.
handling of interregional externalities, supplying national or international
public goods, making tax choices on geographically mobile bases, etc.
Specifically, the above threefold distinction by the authors corresponds to
procedures of:
                                                
7 An exercise effectively achieved for a real life international environmental externality (SO2
emissions) in Kaitala, Mäler and Tulkens 1995 and further pursued in Germain, Toint  and
Tulkens 1995.
8 As I argued in Tulkens 1978, section 4.
9  Which they call "principles" of federalism.
10  The authors call this "economic" federalism. (Apologies to the authors for substituting again
my own words).8
- technocratic planning conducted at the federal level, under institutional form
(i);
- unanimous agreement between representatives of each of the lower tier
governments, under institutional form (ii) ;
-  majority vote of elected representatives of the lower tier governments, under
institutional form (iii) .
This taxonomy of alternative forms of federal coordination can readily be
applied to the Musgravian models of interactions presented above (thinking, if
relevant, in terms of more than just the two entities A and B ; both the models
and the diagrams perfectly allow for that). It can of course be similarly applied
to most other forms of interaction between federated entities.
What does it teach us about the outcome of cooperation in a federation?
If planning is understood in the old sovietic mode, its authoritarian
character is contradictory with the idea of cooperation; it is thus of no interest to
us. If instead planning is viewed in the sense of the resource allocation
processes referred to above, it is essentially an information device. In particular,
it identifies and computes the economic surplus that is generated along the path
of efficiency gains. It also can compute various ways of sharing that surplus
among the parties involved: fair ways, strategically stable ways, incentive
compatible ways
11... Planning in this democratic and "enlightened" sense
should apparently solve completely the problem of achieving efficiency.
However, is such information sufficient for collective decisions to occur?
Negotiations between the parties involved always follow their gathering of
information. This is where the second Inman and Rubinfeld institutional form
of federalism — cooperative federalism in their terms — comes in. The focus is
on the negotiation process itself, seen as coasian bargaining. The authors'
evaluation of it is a skeptical one, due to a number of difficulties: "inability of
the parties to agree on how the surplus [... ] should be divided", poor estimates
of each other's threat point, concealment of information, complications of
strategic interplay when the number of jurisdictions is large. "The overall record
                                                
11  This takes unexpected forms in the case of sharing the surplus generated by a public input in
a federal setting, as we discovered in Cattoir and Tulkens 20009
has not been impressive", they conclude, adding: "Our reading of the historical
and contemporary evidence does not provide much support for the claim that
lower-tier governments can solve their important collective action problems on
their own through unanimous Coasian agreements" (p. 50).
Should this disappointing evaluation make us abandon the idea of
cooperative federalism? I do not think so because we probably do not know
enough as yet, in economics and public finance, about what fundamentally
determines cooperation. Even between individuals the source of cooperation is
poorly understood, as witnessed in a synthesis proposed recently by Elinor
Ostrom 2000. Yet there are remarkable advances reported in that paper; they
should provide inspiration for improvent in our our understanding of
cooperation between jurisdictions.
That leaves us with the third institutional form: majority-rule federalism.
I shall not attempt to collect here the pros and cons of it, that Inman and
Rubinfeld 1997a analyze in much detail and with subtlety. Let me simply
record, on the one hand, that the equilibria yielded by majority voting at the
federal level may not be efficient; and, on the other hand, that even when these
equilibria are efficient, the majority vote always implies, by nature, a minority
whose frustration may not be negligible.
Thus each one of the three institutional forms of federalism has its
limitations, and none of them can pretend to guarantee full efficiency.
4. Non cooperative equilibria as "fall back" positions in federal affairs
After having noticed that cooperation has limitations, one is naturally led
to ask: what is the outcome if cooperation does not take place? The federal
framework suggests as an answer that each entity will then seek to implement,
on the issues of common interest, the policies which are best for itself, given the
policies chosen by the other entities in the federation.
This situation is nothing else than a non cooperative equilibrium
between the entities in the sense of Nash 1951. It can be illustrated by means of10
the Musgravian diagrams of 1966. In the case of Figure 1 diagrams, for
instance
12, under no cooperation Region A chooses
13  OL
N and Region B, OG
N
(see Figure 3).
This well defined outcome, which of course generalizes to any number of
regions, was not pointed out in Richard's paper because his interest was only in
characterizing efficiency in the presence of externalities in general. But in the
federal setting that I want to deal with presently, this particular situation is of
considerable relevance and interest for several reasons.
First, it makes clear that a conceptual alternative can be conceived of to
cooperation within the federation — and that this alternative is not necessarily
chaos, or dismantling of the country, or disappearance of the public sector, or
still some other catastrophical event — as hinted by some
14 in political debates.
Instead, non cooperative fiscal equilibria are to be seen as reasonable "fall back
positions" that will prevail in case cooperation cannot be achieved.
                                                
12 To handle case II, more should be specified concerning the supply curves.
13 Strictly speaking, this is correct only under an assumption of separability  in the preference
functions of  both A and B  between the demands for YA and YB.
14 This attitude is often oberved in young federations, and typically in Belgium, where at each
step taken in the devolution process, litanies of fearful statements on the future of the country
are recited even by otherwise competent intellectuals.
3: Non cooperative equilibrium between A and B





































Notice that there is no reason to consider that a Nash equilibrium be of the
nature of agressive threats that the parties would make against each other: the
concept indeed rests on maximizing own regional benefit rather on maximizing
harm to others.
Second, it follows from this first argument that non cooperative equilibria
are worth studying for their own sake, so as to enable one to formulate relevant
policy statements. In the literature of the last 15 - 20 years, much research and
attention have been devoted to Nash equilibria between jurisdictions
15.
A most common trait of these works has been to emphasize the
inefficiency feature of these equilibria; and on that basis many authors just
dismissed the subject. But others have gone a few steps farther, for instance in
attempting to answer all sorts of questions on the economic magnitudes
involved: is public spending at such equilibria larger or smaller than at
federally efficient levels? Are the taxes too high or too low? As a result
directions of tax "reforms" are getting identified, in search for improvements on
these equilibria.
A major example of non cooperative arrangements in federations is the
phenomenon of tax competition. Within the European Union
16, this
phenomenon plagues the correct levy of taxes on savings and on capital
income, as everybody knows. The conceptual apparatus I am recalling here
suggests that we are at present at a non cooperative equilibrium of some sort in
this matter.
But I note from statements accompanying the reforms currently under
preparation that a distinction is being made between "harmful" and "not
harmful" fiscal competition. This amounts to recognize that not all fiscal
competition equilibria are bad ones. Those which are not bad may not
                                                
15 Bergstrom, Blume and Varian1986 provide an early and rich analysis of Nash equilibira in a
model of voluntary provision of public goods. However, the actors involved in their model are
individuals rather than juridictions. They are thus led to consider issues less directly relevant to
federalism.
16 Wich is not — yet — a federation, of course, but has many traits of it.12
necessarily be efficient; but their degree of inefficiency may be small or
innocuous.
This is why I would claim that better and more detailed knowledge of
these equilibria and measurement of their distance from efficiency is desirable,
for each category of taxes just as well as for expenditures with spillovers. That
the early Musgrave diagrams were in fact offering a first step in that very
direction is a conforting fact to engage us further in that task.
5. Searching for the Roots of Federalism
Let us now pursue the reasoning sketched out at the beginning of Section
4, with the further following question: if no cooperation is taking place and just
a Nash equilibrium prevails between the members of the federation, what
distinguishes this outcome from a confederation or even from a set of separate
states?
17 In fact, the Musgrave diagrams, interpreted above in a federally
decentralized context, apply equally well to two separate and independent
states who interact with one another through the externalities generated by
commodity Y.
Entertaining this kind of question should bring us in the area of
constitutional law, for which I have no particular competence. Let me therefore
remain within the domains of public finance, with its unmistakable support
from economic theory.
Notice that on all my themes thus far on federalism, economics provides
rich conceptual supports: externalities and public goods to describe interactions
between entities
18; efficiency and equity to specify objectives for cooperation;
                                                
17 This is pretty much a European question. Indeed, it is a characteristic of the U.S. economic
literature on fiscal federalism that while authors pay much attention to how spending and
taxing powers are devolved to higher or lower tiers of government, and seek for optimal or
equilibrium degrees of decentralization, they hardly ever consider the question of the extreme
degree of decentralization — that is, the breaking up of a federal state into separate states. A
major excception is, of course, Inman and Rubinfeld 1997b to which I return below.
18 And I should add the one of "reaction functions" if I had gone into more details on non
cooperative equilibria.13
non cooperative equilibria to illustrate decentralization; bargaining and voting
models to formalize decision processes within the federation... Most of these
concepts have been developed during the last half century. In short, one can say
that public finance has thereby provided a lot to better understand the logic of
federations and to derive from them improved levels of welfare.
Do public finance and economic theory provide similar conceptual tools to
handle my question on decentralization beyond federalism?
To make my point sufficiently precise, let me remind us from
constitutional law that, according to standard legal categories
19, a federation is a
nation (or a State) whose existence results from a constitution adopted by its
population as a result of some voting procedure. A confederation, to the
contrary, is neither a nation nor a state; it owes its existence not to a constitution
but to a contract — a treaty — unanimously signed by representatives of its
member states and ratified by their respective domestic institutions.
Thus, decentralization beyond federalism  amounts essentially to an
abandonment of the constitutional link — while in the opposite direction, the
creation of a federation, say in the European Union, implies writing and
adopting a constitution.
For understanding what determines these steps — from constitution to
contract, or from contract to constitution — I see no tool presently available in
our discipline, well accepted and of sufficient generality.
There is however an important contribution  in that direction. In section
2.3 of their 1997b extended survey on the political theory of federalism
(companion to their 1997a article), Inman and Rubinfeld have formulated a
model of constitutional choice based on benefits and costs of alternative
institutional specifications of the federation as to (i) assignment of policy
responsibility across levels of government and (ii) degree of representation of
local interests within the central government. While the details of the model do
account for essential components of the problem, the authors recognize that
                                                
19 As reported, e.g. in Schmitt 1994.14
their formulation does not lend itself, as yet, to conclusions of general nature.
The proposed approach, though, is promising.
6. Conclusion
In the Musgravian world we can also find a hint towards answering the
difficult question of the existence of a nation in spite of possible extreme
decentralization. In his reply (Musgrave 1997) to the Inman and Rubinfeld
paper in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, one finds a sentence that points in
the following terms to the heart of the issue: "Ultimately, finding the
appropriate jurisdiction [... has mainly to do ...] with the question, very much
with us today, of how closely-knit a nation the member jurisdictions of the
federation wish to form" (p.67, italics added).
It is not clear how the prevailing concepts of utility functions, private and
public goods, equilibria and optima can accommodate the idea of a "closely-knit
nation". Probably do we need to discover or construct other and new
conceptual tools to master it. If someone could succeed in this task, public
finance would bring about still another valuable contribution to the
understanding and to the welfare of our nations.
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